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Abstract 
The food systems/global environmental change nexus is a key area of research that links two 
major interconnected challenges humanity faces in the 21st century. This paper discusses the 
role of strategic foresight for tackling these challenges in spaces that aim to facilitate 
deliberative, multi-actor governance. First, we reflect on the role of foresight in the domains 
of global food futures and global environmental change and its impacts on governance in 
these domains. Then, we explore how lessons from both domains can be integrated by 
examining an on-going international foresight program: the CGIAR program on Climate 
Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS). Using multi-stakeholder scenarios 
interacting with global market/water/land cover models, this program explores trade-offs, 
synergies and other relationships between food security and environmental governance in the 
developing world. The CCAFS foresight process takes a complex systems approach, 
exploring the inter-connectedness of food systems and environmental systems. This systems 
approach includes the acknowledgement that diverse sources of knowledge and experience 
are crucial both to systems understanding and to concerted action toward sustainable and 
accepted change. Key to the CCAFS foresight process is the ambition to go beyond a 
disconnected futures process and to integrate foresight into the daily realities of multi-actor 
governance. We discuss how well the CCAFS foresight program connects food systems and 
environmental change futures and whether it succeeds in integrating strategic foresight in 
both governance dimensions. Based on this case we outline challenges and opportunities for 
foresight in the food systems/environments nexus. 
 
Introduction 
The food systems/global environmental change nexus is a key area of research that links two 
major interconnected challenges humanity faces in the 21
st
 century. The complex challenges 
and trade-offs relating to food insecurity and environmental change in the developing world 
demand collaborative action by diverse actors across system dimensions (biophysical, 
economic, policy, temporal) and levels (local, regional, global) (Cash et al. 2006; Ericksen et 
al. 2009; Vervoort et al. in press). Interacting human and natural systems and their contexts 
are constantly changing, as are stakeholder groups and interests operating within them (Folke 
2006). This generates irreducible and dynamic uncertainty which confounds attempts to 
develop linear and unilateral policies (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993; van der Sluijs 2005). It 
requires state and non-state decision makers to look beyond adaptation oriented to single 
stressors such as climate change. Instead, decision makers have to co-manage change along 
continuously adaptive pathways, attending to diverse and shifting contextual challenges while 
proactively aiming for dynamic goals such as improved food security and environmental 
sustainability (Stafford Smith et al. 2011). To play a relevant role in such sense- and 
decision-making processes, research needs to employ a systems perspective that is attentive 
to changing interactions across system dimensions and levels (Cash et al. 2006; Ericksen et 
al. 2009). This type of research should involve stakeholders holding different and often 
contesting types of expertise, experience, values and interests (Gibbons 1999). It can 
facilitate exchange by co-creating boundary objects that span boundaries between various 
stakeholders (Jasanoff 2004; Kristjanson et al. 2009; Clark et al. 2011; Chaudhury et al. 
2012).  
This paper discusses how strategic futures work through scenarios and back-casting can help 
sense– and decision-making in multi-stakeholder contexts to navigate the interacting 
challenges of food security and environmental change. To this end, we first introduce what 
we mean by multi-stakeholder futures. We then discuss the role of multi-stakeholder futures 
on the issue of environmental change, and similarly examine such processes in the context of 
food security. Following a comparison of practices around these issues, we discuss a process 
facilitated by the CGIAR research programme on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food 
Security that seeks to link food security and environmental change and actors involved in 
these issues at the regional (sub-continental) level through multi-stakeholder futures work. 
Multi-stakeholder futures 
A wide range of methods exists for futures research and are applied to a wide range of issues 
and across sectors, including both global environmental change and agriculture and food 
security. Computer model-based forecasting involves projecting a continued interplay of 
historical trends into the future and often strives towards assigning probabilities to the 
subsequent range of future outcomes. Plausibility-based scenarios, by contrast, seek to 
maintain an open future and operate as reframing rather than forecasting devices (Kok et al. 
2006a; Wilkinson and Ramirez 2010). 
There are many different ways to build plausibility-based scenarios and the design of the 
scenario process rests on several factors, including the client(s) and purpose of the 
intervention (van Notten et al. 2003; Van der Heijden 2005; van Vuuren et al. 2012). 
Scenarios are a means and not an end, but rather part of a wider intervention. Purposes vary 
from sense making, through decision support to conflict avoidance and resolution. Futures 
methodology can combine different methods e.g. participatory scenarios, integrated 
assessment models, visioning and back casting, to engage the multiple legitimate perspectives 
and interests involved in framing and addressing today’s significant messy challenges 
(Wilkinson and Eidinow 2008).  More linear sense- and decision-making processes that do 
not incorporate multiple scenarios still have underlying assumptions about the future, 
effectively operating from a single scenario that is not examined. This failure of traditional 
planning to engage with uncertainty has proven to be problematic when actors are operating 
in complex systems (van der Sluijs 2005). 
Scenarios development can provide spaces for actors with diverse sources of knowledge and 
experience, and potentially with opposing interests and agendas, to explicate their views, 
learn from each other and develop a shared language and understanding (Wilkinson and 
Eidinow 2008). Because actors’ stakes in the long-term future are less defined than stakes in 
the present, the future offers a vital space for conflict and revealing underlying myths and 
beliefs that are implicit in framing problems and legitimising actions, can empower a 
requisite variety of perspectives and enable more options to be considered (Wilkinson and 
Ramirez 2010). 
However, since scenarios deal with actors’ contexts rather than directly with their strategies, 
they do not offer a direct method for adaptive decision making. To be able to get to 
collaborative adaptation pathways, the scenarios should be used in strategic processes that are 
specifically aimed at generating pathways of policies and actions.  Back-casting, or 
backwards planning, is such a method  (Kok et al. 2011; Robinson et al. 2011).  Back-casting 
starts with a desired, normative goal and then works out what needs to be happening before 
that goal is achieved, and the successive steps that are needed until the present is reached. 
The result is a pathway from a desired future to the present that highlights short- and mid-
term actions that are needed. The advantage of back-casting is that it takes strategic planners 
away from planning forward into the future in a linear manner, an approach that can lead to 
plans that build on the past rather than for a dynamic and uncertain future. Back-casting has 
been used by Kok et al. (2011) and Robinson et al. (2011) in conjunction with scenarios. By 
combining the two methods, the strength of scenarios (exploring the challenges and 
opportunities offered by plausible futures) is combined with the goal-based approach of back-
casting to explore what adaptive pathways need to be realized to improved conditions in each 
of the alternative scenarios and what the major obstacles and opportunities are in each future 
world. 
In this way, the scenarios act as alternate future contexts in which different adaptation 
pathways can be developed and tested under different plausible and dynamic future 
conditions that each offer distinct challenges and opportunities as the back-casting pathways 
develop through them (Figure 1). The combination of scenarios and back-casting becomes a 
tool for exploring adaptation pathways that are also dynamically goal-oriented and not 
limited by a reactive stance. Through the combination of scenarios and back-casting, shared 
knowledge developed by multiple stakeholders in the scenarios can be used to develop new, 
collaborative adaptation pathways and test their feasibility (Kok et al. 2011). The process can 
also guide priority setting, providing enabling conditions for such adaptation pathways 
(Stafford Smith et al. 2011). Importantly, the combination of scenarios and back-casting is a 
process that can help build collective strategic capacity. New partnerships can emerge as 
collective adaptation plans are made. 
Multi-stakeholder futures in the context of global environmental change 
Multi-stakeholder futures work, specifically in the context of scenarios, has been applied in a 
wide range of environmental assessments.  Many of the environmental assessments that 
included scenarios work were done at the global level;  there are also many examples of 
national and sub-national assessments as well as some regional  examples where scenarios 
work was used. Van Vuuren et al. (2012) and Wilkinson and Eidinow (2008) each provide 
insightful overviews of the use of scenarios in environmental assessment.  
Vuuren et al. (2012) focus on global environmental assessments that involved scenarios 
processes. They point out that a multiple futures approach forms a key element in many 
global environmental assessments because of the need to explore the long-term effects of 
near-term actions. They point out that in the context of complex interactions between human 
and natural systems prediction is often not possible.  
The Limits to Growth report of the Club of Rome played an important role of introducing 
scenarios to environmental science (Meadows 1972), though their projections were not yet 
labelled “scenarios” and did not have a play the role of an interaction space between 
stakeholders. Building on this beginning, in the last 15 years there has been an increasing role 
for scenarios in global environmental assessments such as the IPCC (Nakicenovic 2000), the 
Global Environmental Outlook reports by UNEP (UNEP 2007), the Global Scenarios 
Group’s work on Great Transitions (Gallopin 2002) and the Millennium Ecosystems 
Assessment (Millennium Ecosystems Assessment 2005). 
The first distinction Van Vuuren et al. (2012) make is between scenarios and forecasts, 
observing that all major global environmental assessments have used plausible scenarios 
rather than attempting to forecast the future. Secondly, the authors distinguish between 
probabilistic versus deterministic scenarios. Probabilistic scenarios aim to specify the 
probability of different trends by attaching probability-distribution functions to input 
parameters. This approach has not been used in global environmental assessments because 
many of the drivers discussed in these assessments are unknown at a fundamental level where 
probabilities cannot be assigned. Deterministic scenarios, in contrast, describe specific, 
concrete futures that span the space of uncertainty as far as the stakeholders participating in 
the process have scoped. A third distinction made by van Vuuren et al.  (2012) is between 
process and product orientation. They state that in contexts where there is a distinct client or 
group of clients who may be directly involved in the scenario work, the process may be seen 
as more important than the product, but since many global environmental assessments are 
developed for a very diffused audience, they tend to focus on the product. The IPCC work is 
a particular example of a largely expert-driven  and product-oriented process.   
The distinction between product and process also relates to the need or willingness for the 
process designers to engage with a broad diversity of stakeholders. Because of the broadness 
of most intended audiences in global environmental assessments, these processes often 
feature review moments of the scenarios rather than co-development. This relative lack of 
participation has been seen as a weakness of scenarios work in global environmental 
assessments. Their development by relatively small groups of largely environmental 
scientists, largely limiting the presence of social scientists while describing future changes 
relevant to social science expertise, has limited their scope. More broadly, the lack of 
participation by other sectors limits their logics to those present in academia. Another 
distinction to be made is the extent to which scenarios processes have used qualitative and 
quantitative methods. Most global environmental assessment scenarios combine these two 
elements to some degree. Storylines provide the logic for alternate futures, and can be useful 
to translate the scenarios to different contexts and generally to engage audiences. 
Quantification through modelling helps provide scientific rigour (dependent on the quality of 
the models and available information about causal relationships and data). However, there is 
an imbalance between the social science underpinning the scenario narratives and the greater 
time and effort put into the quantification of the environmental dimensions of the scenarios in 
most global environmental assessments. A key problem with environmental change models is 
that they are largely unable to quantify discontinuities in systems and are limited to smooth 
trends (van Notten et al. 2005). 
 
Scenarios can be either explorative, describing what “could” happen, or normative, 
describing desired futures of what “should” or “should not” happen and that explore the 
implications of policy interventions. Van Vuuren et al. (2012) show that most scenarios in 
global environmental assessments before 2005 have been exploratory scenarios, while those 
from after 2005 have been normative scenarios, reflecting a need for more policy relevance 
but arguably losing the benefits of the explorative approach. Both versions of scenarios have 
been used in global environmental assessments. Scenarios can also be “back-cast” from 
defined futures and then linked back to the present, or “forecast” from a set of imposed rules 
from the base year on. 
 
An distinction between scenarios in global environmental assessments that is especially 
relevant for the global environmental governance perspective is whether scenarios are used to 
“speak truth to power”, providing clear answers and legitimizing policies, or as an “arena” to 
stimulate debate between multiple stakeholders.  
 
There are strong differences in the degree the global environmental assessment scenarios are 
linked to policy processes. The IPCC scenarios are directly linked to the UNFCCC process. 
In the Millennium Ecosystems Assessment, the link to international policy was less clear and 
the role of governments was less defined. Another example is the UNEP Global 
Environmental Outlook which is principally target to UNEP as the funding organisation but 
also indirectly seeks to connect to a wider audience of member states. 
 
Due to pressures to be credible to a wide range of audiences, most global environmental 
assessment scenarios do not involve surprises or extreme futures, which leads to criticism of 
these scenarios not exploring a broad scope of uncertainty  
 
Van Vuuren et al. (2012) argue that many global environmental assessment scenarios overlap 
and that in fact “scenario families” can be identified that capture many aspects of similar 
scenarios across the assessments. Because of the weaknesses of scenarios work in global 
environmental assessments mentioned previously (lack of stakeholder inclusion, under-
representation of social science expertise) this observation that the scenarios largely fall in 
these scenario families is worrying. It indicates that together the global environmental 
assessment scenarios capture a certain scope of the future without offering much diversity. 
This worry is exacerbated by the reality that many scenarios processes in global 
environmental assessments build on previous, similar efforts.  
 
Wilkinson and Eidinow (2008) argue that environmental assessment scenarios have been 
limited by what they label “problem-oriented” scenarios approaches. Seeing scenarios as a 
tool to reduce uncertainty about the future through sophisticated modelling limits the ability 
of these processes to play a role in deliberative governance models. Wilkinson and Eidinow 
offer the alternative that is prominent in scenarios use in the business world, where scenarios 
processes have a very distinct client (the company) and involve that client in the scenarios 
development to “re-perceive” their context and thereby come to new insights and strategies 
(Wilkinson and Eidinow 2008). However, they argue that the multi-stakeholder deliberative 
governance needed to begin to tackle environmental issues should incorporate and go beyond 
both the “problem-oriented” and “actor-oriented” models. Offering a new model which they 
describe as “reflexive interventionist multi actor” scenarios (RIMA), they argue for a much 
more reflexive process that engages new groups of actors dynamically through new iterations 
of futures exploration, allowing these new actor groups to critically question the assumptions 
of previous scenarios, and using the scenarios process as a way for various actors to explicate 
and discuss their own fundamental assumptions about the world, as well as those of others. 
 Multi-stakeholder futures in the context of agriculture and food security 
A recent study by the GFAR Global Foresight Hub (Bourgeois et al. in preparation) has 
aimed to collect and analyse a wide range of futures work in the context of agriculture and 
food security. The project selected 43 case studies  on global, regional, national and local 
levels in this context that it deemed were most relevant to explore and compare more in-
depth. We will base our overview of the use of multi-stakeholder futures in the context of 
agriculture and food security on this inventory. It is relevant to note that the CCAFS 
scenarios process that is the focal case study in this paper was also part of the inventory. 
More than half of the cases described in the inventory is concerned with futures exploration 
for sense-making. A minority of the cases is primarily interested in impacting priority setting 
and policy change. Capacity building and networking are the most minor objectives, being 
mentioned as objectives in only 2 and 3 cases, respectively.  
 
In contrast to the environmental assessment scenarios sets, Bourgeois et al. show that the 
futures work related to agriculture and food security offers some major differences and 
controversies, and does not fall so easily in a set of “scenario families”.  
 
Just as in environmental assessments, there are distinctions between scenarios processes in 
agriculture and food security in terms of the presence of quantitative and narrative elements. 
While qualitative assessments using narratives have been done across all levels, quantitative 
analyses are more prevalent at the global level.  
 
In contrast to the environmental assessments, a number of cases in the GFH inventory stress 
the importance of interdisciplinary exchange and the use of futures work to experiment and 
hold constructive debates among stakeholders. Together with these aims comes the interest in 
working with top-down and bottom-up approaches simultaneously. The higher presence of 
inclusivity in the agriculture and food security cases also relates to a need to combine 
quantitative and qualitative, narrative-based enquiry. However, despite the higher ambitions 
for inclusivity, in reality many futures processes in this context involved relatively few 
people – global futures efforts mostly included less than 50 participants in their processes. A 
more mixed-method, inclusive picture emerges in comparison to global environmental 
assessments that is nonetheless dominated by researchers in international organizations, 
academia and government institutes in developed countries, and, at the global level, is 
dominated by quantitative analysis.  
 
Impacts of futures processes in agriculture and food security have mainly been identified as 
raising awareness and fostering debates beyond the participants in the work, helping 
stakeholders develop new links amongst themselves and contributing to the developments of 
methods, internally and externally. Beyond this, direct impacts on internal (e.g. 
organizational) and external policies due to the futures work have been reported in several 
cases. Awareness-raising was reported to have happened due to the provocative or 
challenging nature of the outcomes of processes. Cases that had such impacts all had a 
quantitative dimension to their results. Direct policy impacts were largely reported when the 
work was commissioned by a decision-maker. Most of these cases were conducted at a 
national or at the most regional (e.g. sub-continental) level.  
 
In analysing this collection of futures studies in the context of agriculture and food security, 
Bourgeois et al. (in preparation) highlight a number of improvements in these types of 
processes. These improvements came out of a series of interactions between members of the 
Global Foresight Hub’s Forward Thinking Platform, where representatives of 30 of the 43 
case studies participated, including authors of this paper.  These participants concluded that 
futures work in agriculture and food security should focus more on how impacts can be made 
with decision-makers, both in terms of tools and methods (linking visions to actions, for 
example) and in terms of processes (including decision-makers in the future explorations). 
ICT was seen as a key potential area to be explored to up-scale the engagement of key 
participants across sectors. This links to the recognition that a greater level of inter-
institutional and inter-sector collaboration is needed to open explorations up to new insights 
and capitalize on available knowledge. There is a capacity building dimension to this need for 
linking and bridging that would involve more training in futures methods.  
 
Using multi-stakeholder futures to link deliberative governance around agriculture, 
food security and environmental change 
 
Global environmental change in the forms of climate change, loss of biodiversity, land 
degradation and changes in hydrology is impacting food security and the expectation is that 
this impact will grow in the future (Ericksen et al. 2009). Similarly, agriculture impacts 
environmental change, e.g. through land conversion, eutrophication and emissions. To tackle 
the interconnected challenges of present and future food security and environmental change, 
deliberative sense –and decision-making methods are needed that enhance understanding and 
enable more adaptive policies. As discussed in the contexts of environmental change on the 
one hand and agriculture and food security on the other, multi-stakeholder futures processes 
have the potential to facilitate such sense– and decision-making processes. However, as both 
sections have shown, current activities in these contexts with regard to futures work have 
some limitations.  
 
Global environmental change scenarios incorporate agricultural developments and even 
include food security and consumption, sometimes to a significant extent. Agricultural 
production is largely seen through the lens of “use of natural resources”. In contrast, 
agriculture and food security scenarios and other future projections feature environmental 
change consequences somewhat less prominently and incorporate less dimensions, especially 
when processes operate from a largely technocratic, production-oriented perspective.  
 
Most research linking global environmental change and food systems focuses primarily on 
the impact of climate change on agricultural production, or the impact of agriculture on 
problems around land conversion and use, pollution and biodiversity. Other aspects of food 
systems such as processing, distributing and consuming food are largely overlooked 
(Ericksen et al. 2009).  
 
Importantly, groups of stakeholders linked to environmental change and stakeholders linked 
to various aspects of food systems have largely not interacted in futures-oriented arenas.  
 
A notable exception has been the GECAFS scenarios process that was specifically built on a 
new definition of the food system (Ingram 2010). Regional scenarios were developed for the 
Indo-Gangetic Plain and the Caribbean with an interdisciplinary group of experts. These 
scenarios were linked to the Millennium Ecosystems Assessment – which demonstrates their 
explicit link to environmental change scenarios.  This scenarios process was largely focused 
on collaborative sense-making and did not feature an explicit policy planning element. As a 
sense- making process, it produced insights specifically revealed by the combination of 
global environmental change knowledge and its inclusive perspective on food systems 
(Ingram 2010). The scenarios work in GECAFS provided the basis for further and more 
extensive work for the CCAFS program, our case study for using scenarios to link global 
environmental change and food security futures.  
 
Case study: regional scenarios for the CGIAR climate change, agriculture and food 
security program 
 
The CGIAR research program on Climate Change, Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS) 
is a global alliance that engages in a range of research, capacity building and policy guidance 
activities focusing on climate change adaptation and mitigation pathways across food system 
dimensions and levels in the developing world (Vermeulen et al. 2012). Within the CCAFS 
program, sub-continental multi-stakeholder futures processes employing scenarios and back-
casting methods are being undertaken in different sub-continental regions in the developing 
world (East Africa, West Africa, South Asia). These multi-stakeholder futures processes are 
designed to help support adaptive sense- and decision-making under future uncertainty. The 
CCAFS regional scenarios process builds on previous experience from the GECAFS project. 
This includes the express focus on food systems rather than just agricultural production, and a 
strong link to environmental change scenarios.  
 
This systems approach includes the acknowledgement that diverse sources of knowledge and 
experience are crucial both to systems understanding and to concerted action toward 
sustainable and accepted change.  
In the CCAFS scenarios process, we aim to learn from the challenges and limitations found in 
both the environmental assessment futures work and in the futures experiences in the context 
of agriculture and food security. We will first outline the basic elements of the process and 
discuss some results. In the discussion,  we will evaluate to what extent we are in the process 
of successfully bridging futures work in environmental change and food systems, and to what 
degree we are able to tackle some of the challenges identified in the reviews of both of these 
fields.  
The CCAFS strategic futures process links research and policy and across system levels 
(Figure 2) through five distinct interactions:  
1. The development of regional scenarios with actors across sectors, based on an 
exploration of key regional uncertainties;  
2. The quantification of the regional scenarios through research formalized in models 
and other means that link stakeholder-driven assumptions and their effects (e.g. 
through technology, government support, infrastructure) for food security and 
environmental change; 
3. The use of the scenarios as decision contexts for deliberative governance at a regional 
level;  
4. The translation and use of the scenarios as decision contexts local level planning; 
5. The use of the regional scenarios process as a case study to link to global strategic 
futures such as the IPCC Shared Socio-economic Pathways (Moss et al. 2010).  
 
1  Multi-stakeholder regional scenarios development  
The first aim in the scenario development process is to capture key drivers and uncertainties 
at the regional scale with key regional actors in policy, the private sector, civil society, the 
media and epistemic communities and explore their consequences for future food security 
and environmental change. The scenario sets in each region are structured along the two 
drivers that are seen by regional actors as both highly relevant and highly uncertain – but 
many other key drivers feature across all scenarios. The scenarios mainly focus on socio-
economic uncertainties and are used as complementary to climate scenarios.  Initially, climate 
change was treated the same across all scenarios, given the relative certainty around this 
driver up to 2030 perceived by stakeholders based on estimates from Jones and Thornton 
(2009). More recently and based on new stakeholder feedback across the regions, we have 
revised this process to develop scenarios that run up to 2050 which allows a combination 
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between multiple climate scenarios and socio-economic scenarios, along the lines of the new 
IPCC framework (Moss et al. 2010) though with a different scope. 
Self-evaluation of outcomes of the scenarios process in East Africa suggests that initial 
benefits of the process are perceived by most participants as: learning new skills and insights; 
better understanding of concepts around future uncertainty and complexity, including the 
difference between projections and forecasts and plausible scenarios; and a clear idea of how 
scenarios could be used in adaptive strategy development for food security and environmental 
management. Since part of the self-reporting was done some time after a scenarios 
development workshop, a number of participants were reporting that they went on to use 
scenarios in their own planning processes. These stakeholders reported that they thought the 
scenarios content as well as process address criteria of saliency, credibility and legitimacy 
deemed critical for linking science to policy (Cash et al. 2003). 
2. Quantification of the scenarios through integrated agricultural products market and land 
cover change models 
Once regional stakeholders had developed qualitative story lines that describe plausible, 
alternative futures, these scenarios were modelled to allow quantification of key outcomes 
and indicators. Different agricultural economic modelling tools are being used to do this, 
particularly the IMPACT (Rosegrant et al. 1995) and GLOBIOM (Havlík et al. 2011) models. 
These are both global partial equilibrium models, but they have different strengths and 
weaknesses. IMPACT is designed to examine alternative futures for global food supply, 
demand, trade and prices, while GLOBIOM is designed to provide policy advice on global 
issues concerning land use competition between major land-based production sectors and the 
conversion of natural land. GLOBIOM also models emissions from land use change. While 
IMPACT and GLOBIOM are global models, they are being modified to enable specific 
regional applications to be simulated.   
 
In East Africa, the scenarios were quantified to inform the model drivers based on semi-
quantitative assessments from stakeholders. Preliminary results from the two models were 
discussed with representatives of the regional stakeholder group who provided feedback after 
which some changes were made to make the model results more plausible for the region. The 
models yielded significant but plausible differences between the scenarios and between the 
two sets of model outputs and a number of insights for the region. After presenting the model 
results in subsequent workshops, participants thought the model results were “were tangible 
and practical” and that they felt the outputs would be useful for “planners and decision 
makers seeking legitimate information before making choices”, requesting detailed 
information on the model results to take back to their organizations and ministries. However, 
impacts of the subsequent use of model information in these contexts are yet to be measured 
and require more time.  
 
An important avenue for making the scenarios more relevant for adaptive decision-making is 
the link between short-term variability and long-term change in socio-economic and 
biophysical drivers. Short-term price spikes and market volatility present considerable 
challenges for food security, not least because of their interactions with longer-term trends; 
the same is true for short-term climate variability and longer-term progressive change. 
Adaptive decision-making has to tackle challenges generated by changes on these interacting 
time resolutions – all the more reason for a reflexive and dynamic futures process that attends 
to both. The CCAFS regional scenarios are attempting to address the interactions between 
these time resolutions. The interactions of the process with local-level analysis allow this 
complementarity to be stronger still. But while qualitative scenarios can feature both short-
term changes and longer changes over their time lines, when scenarios are quantified, models 
usually address either to long-term changes or short-term variability. Efforts are being made 
to overcome this division: a version of the GLOBIOM model is under development that will 
allow the CCAFS regional scenarios to be quantified in relation to the impacts of short-term 
variability in economic drivers as well as longer-term trends (Fuss et al. 2011). 
3.  Using the scenarios for strategic planning with regional state and non-state actors 
 
Our experience with engagement with both non-state and state actors in separate workshops, 
corroborated by participants’ evaluations, is that they were successful in enhancing the 
abilities of the participants to think more strategically about future adaptive pathways, as well 
as start to grasp more fully the cross-sectoral and cross-country dialogues and partnerships 
urgently needed to tackle regional food systems and food security issues. For example, an 
environmental officer of the East African Community (EAC) took the following messages 
into the budget planning meeting that followed the scenarios workshop: 
 Failure of governments to invest in food security and the environment would have 
severe negative long-term consequences on both, as played out in the “Herd of Zebra” 
scenario – she recognized that this particular scenario was in fact the one that current 
national policies were leading towards. 
 As long as governments within the regions failed to work closely with private sector 
and civil society actors, they would continue to have a limited ability to initiate 
positive change, such as enhancing regional food security. 
 
It became clear, however, as with many engagement processes, that investing in an 
organization that continued to facilitate boundary spanning activities (Clark et al. 2011) 
between researchers, civil society, private sector and public sector actors would be critical to 
turn some of the ideas generated into actions, such as new partnerships, initiatives, 
institutions, and policies (Selsky and Parker 2005). This is referred to by Reid et al. (2009) as 
the “continual engagement model”. It is also apparent that workshops (over several days) are 
not an effective approach for engaging the high-level actors – in both the private and public 
sectors – who are in the best position to turn the ideas generated into actions: they are simply 
too busy and the incentives to engage are not clear to them.  So a key role of the boundary 
organization playing this role (the Society for International Development) supported by the 
CCAFS strategic futures process will be to continue to strengthen the partnerships and turn 
the ideas from both state and non-state actors into actions. Examples include a plan to 
increase the voice of the East Africa Farmers Federation in agricultural and food security 
policy processes; developing a partnership plan between agriculture ministries, government 
meteorological offices and regional media to develop new climate and weather information 
communication outlets in the region; develop exchange visits between East African 
agriculture ministries, and farmers’ schools and associations and link to researchers working 
on climate analogues; setting up a permanent scenarios/strategic futures unit that reports to 
the EAC and provides continuous strategic insight at the regional level in the way that the 
CCAFS scenarios process has done. Strategies such as breakfast meetings between the 
boundary organization, participants willing to act as policy champions and higher-level 
policy makers are being pursued. Additionally, a range of innovative communication outputs 
with regional communication and media specialists (cartoons, briefs, blogs, films, TV 
episodes) are being created. A specific avenue we are exploring is the development of a 
simple on-line application, linked to mobile phone technology, that allows a wide linkage of 
actors across food systems and linked to environmental change issues to communicate with 
simple messages about the future of food security and environmental change in their regions. 
 
4  Linking regional and local strategic futures 
The CCAFS multi-stakeholder futures process is being linked to a range of local strategic 
futures activities within and outside the program. The interaction between the CCAFS 
regional scenarios and local-level strategic futures works both ways: regional scenarios can 
inform local adaptation pathways, and outcomes can be used to inform and enrich the 
scenarios and, by extension, regional adaptive pathways. 
 
5  Links to global environmental and food systems futures 
Several links between the multi-region futures process organized by CCAFS and partners and 
global futures work are being developed, both with environmental change scenarios as well 
as with global futures on agriculture and food security.  The IPCC-led scientific community 
is in the process of finalised a set of five global Shared Socio-economic Pathways (SSPs), 
complementary to new climate scenarios or Representative Concentration Pathways (Moss et 
al. 2010).  With the global community reaching out, the CCAFS scenarios could also be an 
invaluable input to the process of translating the global climate change scenarios to the 
regional level. Part of the CCAFS futures team is also involved in the development of the 
IPCC SSPs which makes this parallel process feasible. The CCAFS scenarios developed for 
East Africa, developed separately from the SSPs, nonetheless fit their framework well while 
offering more regional tensions, challenges and opportunities not perceived at the global 
level.  
In the dimension of agriculture and food security,  the CCAFS scenarios process has been 
used by the Global Foresight Hub as an example of multi-method futures work and to help 
conceptualize different foresight approaches for the future of food and agriculture. The 
Forward Thinking Platform of the Global Foresight Hub plans to help CCAFS develop its 
futures processes by drawing on the collective experience of the network, and additionally to 
ensure the visibility and use of outcomes in the global food and agriculture foresight arenas 
(Vervoort and Ericksen 2012). 
Discussion and conclusions 
This paper has highlighted the need for futures-oriented exploration, through scenarios and 
back-casting, of food systems and environmental change futures. We have first discussed the 
current state of global environmental change scenarios processes as well as scenarios 
processes in agriculture and food security. Though our comparison is not totally symmetrical 
because we mainly looked at environmental change scenarios at the global level while 
looking at agriculture and food security scenarios across levels, we can conclude that there is 
a similarity tendency at the global level in both topic areas not to engage with stakeholders 
and to focus heavily on quantitative modelling. Agriculture and food security scenarios 
processes do offer more diversity in this regard than environmental change scenarios 
processes. This could be related to the nature of the topic and the associated disciplines. Both 
agriculture and food security and global environmental change processes are highly 
interlinked and very much core activities of global actors. However, environmental systems 
have a history of being perceived as the context of human activities, in the form of resources 
or affected natural environments and biophysical systems. Importantly, though, is that while 
both environmental scenarios on the one hand and food security scenarios on the other have 
elements of the other in terms of subject matter, truly interdisciplinary analyses are rare. This 
is most clearly the case with regard to the engagement of actors from both of these topic areas 
in multi-stakeholder scenarios.   
 
This paper mentioned the GECAFS project as an exception where global environmental 
change and food security scenarios were connected in a multi-stakeholder context. Building 
on the experiences in this project, the CCAFS scenarios process was set up, discussed here as 
a case study.  
The CCAFS scenarios process attempts to link agriculture, food security and environmental 
change at the regional level in multiple developing world regions. This includes bringing 
stakeholders from both topics together, and modelling some aspects of the trade-offs between 
environmental change governance and food security and agriculture.  The emphasis in this 
scenarios process has still been somewhat more on agriculture and food security than on the 
environment, in the sense that the first topic area has been explored in a more multi-
dimensional way while environmental change has been limited to fewer indicators and 
descriptions of environmental change dynamics - such as biodiversity loss, land use change, 
emissions, ecosystem services. A way to have equal and appropriate multi-dimensionality for 
each inter-connected topic area that the CCAFS scenarios process is exploring is to develop 
more collaboration with the environmental change community through the Future Earth 
program, in terms of participatory processes but also in terms of modelling and 
quantification. The CCAFS scenarios program is attempting to go beyond some of the 
limitations identified in this paper that are associated with scenarios work both in 
environmental and agriculture and food security contexts, by involving a wide range of 
stakeholder groups and disciplines through different, appropriate processes, and through 
linking across geographical levels. However, the risk of such inclusiveness affecting the 
possible depth of inquiry in specific sub-topics has to be managed.   
Our conclusion is that if express attempts are made to overcome current limitations of scope,  
balance and inclusivity in current scenarios processes, there is strong potential for scenarios 
to play a central role in developing integrated systems-perspectives for sense– and decision-
making for multi-actor governance of environmental change, agriculture and food security.  
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